We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the socalled "Bertrand paradox" as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in the following way: The market price cannot be higher than the second lowest marginal cost in any correlated equilibrium.
Introduction
A substantial body of theory in industrial organization and other fields of economics is built on the idea that there are no equilibria with positive expected profits in a simple Bertrand competition model with homogenous goods and symmetric firms-in other words, that there are no profitable cartels and that price competition between n > 1 firms will drive prices down to marginal cost in one-shot price competition. The fact that price competition between two firms is equivalent to perfect competition is often referred to as the "Bertrand paradox".
Yet the theoretical foundation for this idea is not fully clear, especially where correlated equilibria are concerned. In a correlated equilibrium, players can construct a correlation device which gives each player a private recommendation before the players choose their actions. In correlated equilibrium, the device is such that it is an equilibrium for the players to follow the recommendation. Every (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium where the recommendations are independent. Players can in many games achieve higher payoffs in correlated equilibrium than in Nash equilibrium because the device is able to correlate recommendations; see Aumann (1974) . In Bertrand competition, it is conceivable that players could correlate their prices in such a way as to achieve high prices while still (through the shape of the joint price distribution) making sure that none of them wants to deviate. We show that this is not possible, although the argument is somewhat subtle.
More precisely, we show that no correlated equilibrium (and hence also no mixed Nash equilibrium) with positive expected profits can exist in a symmetric Bertrand game with homogenous products and bounded monopoly profits.
1 This is the most general formulation of the Bertrand paradox yet. Our result is certainly desirable because a statement like the Bertrand paradox -implying that zero profits are inevitable in a price competition setting -should naturally be shown using an equilibrium concept that is "permissive", i.e. a solution concept that allows the players to coordinate as much as possible within the paradigm of a one-shot, non-cooperative game. This is exactly what correlated equilibrium does. 2 Our result is not obvious given that the set of rationalizable 1 Wu (2008) claims to prove a similar theorem for symmetric linear costs and linear demand. Note, however, that he does not provide a proof for the central second case in his case distinction and implicitly limits his analysis to a finite action space which is incompatible with the standard version of the Bertrand game. 2 Correlated equilibrium has been shown to have many other attractive properties as well: For example, several simple learning procedures converge to correlated equilibria, see for example Foster and Vohra (1997) , Fudenberg and Levine (1999) , Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) , and unique correlated equilibria are robust to introducing incomplete information, see Kajii and Morris (1997 Our proof is by contradiction: We show that if there was a correlated equilibrium in which prices higher than marginal cost were played with positive probability, then there would be an interval of recommendations in which each player prefers to deviate downwardly from his recommendation. This interval consists of the highest recommendations that a player might get (with positive probability) in the assumed equilibrium.
The contribution of this paper lies in the proof that in Bertrand games with arbitrary demand functions (in which the set of rationalizable actions is infinite), the Bertrand Nash equilibrium is the unique correlated equilibrium.
Apart from that, it is also a generalization (by different methods) of results of Baye and Morgan (1999) and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) on mixed-strategy equilibria in Bertrand games. Baye and Morgan (1999) show that if monopoly profits are unbounded, any positive finite payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) prove that unboundedness of monopoly profits is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of such mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. These insights have led Klemperer (2003, section 5 .1) to conclude that "there are other equilibria with large profits, for some standard demand curves." We show that expected profits in any correlated equilibrium (and therefore in any mixed Nash equilibrium) are zero if demand is such that monopoly profits are bounded. Finally, unlike the cited results, our proof is generalizable to games with asymmetric costs and arbitrarily many players: We show that the highest market price in any correlated equilibrium however, be noted that these papers limit themselves to finite games for technical reasons.
3 Every p i ∈ R + is in our model rationalizable because p i is -assuming zero marginal costs -a best response to p j = 0 which is the Bertrand equilibrium price and therefore itself rationalizable.
equals the second lowest marginal cost. This establishes an (outcome) equivalence of Nash and correlated equilibria also in this more general setup.
A related result is derived in Liu (1996) . Liu shows that the unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot competition with linear demand and constant marginal costs is also the unique correlated equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the Bertrand model with two symmetric firms as well as the concept of correlated equilibrium. Section 3 derives our result. This result is generalized for the case of n non-symmetric firms in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Model
There are two firms with constant marginal costs which are normalized to zero. Firms set prices simultaneously. A correlated equilibrium in this game is a probability distribution F on R + × R + . This probability distribution is interpreted as a correlation device. The correlation device sends recommended prices (r 1 , r 2 ) to the two firms. Each firm i observes r i but does not observe the other firm's recommendation r j . F (p 1 , p 2 ) is the probability that (r 1 , r 2 ) ≤ (p 1 , p 2 ). Roughly speaking, a distribution F is called a correlated equilibrium if both firms find it optimal to follow the recommendation.
To be more precise denote the profits of firm i given prices p i and p j with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j as
Note that we define the profit function such that the own price is the first argument,
i.e. the first argument of π 2 is p 2 .
A strategy for firm i is a mapping from "recommendations" to prices. Both recommendations and prices are in R + . Hence, a strategy is a measurable function ζ i : R + → R + . The identity function represents the strategy of following the recommendation. F is a correlated equilibrium if no firm can gain by unilaterally deviating from a situation where both firms use ζ i = identity function. More formally, we follow the definition of correlated equilibrium for infinite games given in Hart and Schmeidler (1989) and also used in Liu (1996) : A correlated equilibrium is a distribution F on R + × R + such that for all measurable functions ζ i : R + → R + and all i ∈ {1, 2} and i = j ∈ {1, 2} the following inequality holds:
In words, a distribution F is a correlated equilibrium if no player can achieve a higher expected payoff by unilaterally deviating to a strategy ζ i instead of simply following the recommendation. Last, we define a symmetric correlated equilibrium as a correlated
It is well known that both firms set prices equal to zero in the unique Nash equilibrium of this game (usually this is called "Bertrand equilibrium"); see, for example, Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) .
Analysis and Result
We start the analysis by noting that whenever there is a correlated equilibrium F then there is a symmetric correlated equilibrium G in which the aggregated expected profits are the same as in F . This result is, of course, due to the symmetry of our setup. It will allow us later on to focus on symmetric correlated equilibria.
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Lemma 1. Let F be a correlated equilibrium. Then there exists a symmetric correlated equilibrium G such that
Proof. Let F be a correlated equilibrium. DefineF (p 1 , p 2 ) = F (p 2 , p 1 ). Then,F is also a correlated equilibrium as for any measurable function ζ :
where the first equality holds by the definition ofF , the second holds by the symmetry of the setup, i.e. π 1 (x, y) = π 2 (x, y), and the inequality holds as F is a correlated equilibrium.
(p 1 , p 2 ). Then G is a correlated equilibrium as for any measurable function ζ :
where the equality follows from the definition of G and the inequality follows from the fact that F andF are correlated equilibria. Clearly, G is symmetric as
4 Intuitively, we make use of the fact that the set of correlated equilibria in this game is convex-as could be shown by generalizing the following lemma with arbitrary weights instead of by the definition of G andF . Finally, expected profits under F and G are the same as
where the first equality follows from the definition of G andF and the second equality follows from the symmetry of setup, i.e. π 1 (x, y) = π 2 (x, y).
Let F be a symmetric correlated equilibrium. Definep := inf{p :
. Intuitively,p is the price such that (i) the probability that the market price is greater thanp is strictly positive for anyp <p and (ii) the probability that the market price is greater thanp is zero for anyp >p. That is, if we consider the distribution of prices that consumers pay in the correlated equilibrium F ,p is the essential supremum of this "market price distribution". The following lemma establishes thatp exists by showing
and consequently a finitep exists. The intuitive reason for lemma 2 is that setting prices above p mon is a weakly dominated strategy.
Proof. Consider the strategy
where p * ∈ arg max p∈R + pD(p), i.e. p * ≤ p mon is an arbitrary monopoly price. Firm 1's payoff difference between following the recommendation and using the deviation strategy
The integrand of the first integral is strictly negative as p * D(p * ) = max p∈R + pD(p) and larger than the profit at any price above p mon . The second integral is non-positive. Consequently, F can only be a correlated equilibrium, i.e. satisfy (2) ,
Before we proceed, it is useful to define the following sets which will serve as the domain of integration multiple times in the following proofs. For somep ∈ (0,p) and ε ∈ (0, 1), define the sets
Figure 1 depicts the sets. shows E(p); E (p) is identical to E(p) except that the border where p 2 =p is not part of the set.
It follows immediately from the definition ofp and the symmetry of the setup that
5 That is, a firm deviating by chargingp <p given any recommendation will sell with positive probability. This observation will be important later on.
The following lemma shows that there is no probability mass on the diagonal of the distribution F above (p,p) if F is a symmetric correlated equilibrium. This is quite intuitive: The diagonal represents situations in which both firms get the same recommendation. Hence, each firm could discontinuously increase its profits by lowering the price only slightly (thereby capturing all instead of half of the demand) in this situation. If the event that both firms get the same recommendation abovep had positive probability mass, each firm could therefore gain by deviating to a price slightly below its recommendation whenever it receives a recommendation abovep.
Lemma 3. Let F be a symmetric correlated equilibrium. Then, B(p) dF (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0 for anyp ∈ (0,p).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that
Recall that π 1 is discontinuous at points on the diagonal of the (p 1 , p 2 ) plane. Therefore, (2) is violated for
for ε ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to 1: Firm 1's payoff difference between following the recommendation and playing ζ ε can be written as
The first term continuously approaches 0 as ε 1. To see this, note that the first term is (weakly) less than
The second term is non-positive and the third term is strictly negative and bounded away from 0 as ε 1 because B(p) dF (p 1 , p 2 ) > 0. Consequently, ∆ < 0 for sufficiently high ε < 1. This contradicts that F is a correlated equilibrium and therefore
dF (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0 has to hold.
After this auxiliary result, we come to the main result: In any correlated equilibrium, both firms set prices equal to zero with probability 1 and therefore make zero profits.
That is, every correlated equilibrium is essentially equivalent to the Bertrand Nash equilibrium.
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The intuition behind this result is the following: Take a symmetric correlated equilibrium and suppose thatp > 0. Take somep ∈ (0,p). If a firm, say firm 1, deviates by chargingp instead of its recommendation whenever firm 1 receives a recommendation abovep, there are two effects of the deviation: If r 1 > r 2 >p, firm 1 gainsp because it sells while it would not have sold by following the recommendation. If r 2 > r 1 >p, firm 1 loses r 1 −p by deviating because it would have sold at the higher price r 1 if it followed the recommendation. In a symmetric equilibrium both events are equally likely. 7 If one choosesp sufficiently high, the deviation is therefore profitable as thenp >p−p > r 1 −p.
Theorem 1. In every correlated equilibrium F ,p = 0. That is, p 1 = p 2 = 0 with probability 1 in every correlated equilibrium.
Proof. By lemma 1, it is sufficient to show that in any symmetric correlated equilibrium F , we havep = 0. Therefore, we concentrate on symmetric F in the remainder of the proof.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary thatp > 0. Definep = 3 4p
. As
F is a correlated equilibrium, player 1 must get a higher expected payoff from following the recommendation r 1 than from following the deviation strategy
Making use of the sets E(p) and E (p) as defined above, the difference between the expected payoff when following the recommendation and the expected payoff under ζ is
strategy ζ i that differs from the identity function on a set of points that has zero probability under F is also an equilibrium strategy. 7 Note that we do not have to consider the case r 1 = r 2 because of the previous lemma.
where the last equality follows from the symmetry of F and lemma 3 (which states that
as A(p) dF (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0 by the definition ofp andp <p. Note that (3) implies ∆ < 0 which contradicts that F is a correlated equilibrium.
The General Case
Consider the general case of asymmetric marginal costs c i and n firms. The main idea of our proof also applies in this case, and we can show that the market price paid by consumers is less or equal to the second lowest marginal costs with probability one in every correlated equilibrium. Hence, correlated equilibrium is essentially equivalent to the Bertrand Nash equilibrium also in this more general framework.
The setup of this more general model is as follows: Market demand is, as before, The assumption that all consumers buy from the low cost firms in case several firms charge the same price deserves some comment. We make this assumption to ensure the existence of the standard Bertrand Nash equilibrium. If c 2 is lower than the (lowest) monopoly price of firm 1, this well known equilibrium postulates that p 1 = p 2 = c 2 (and arbitrary p i ≥ c i for i ∈ {3, . . . , n}). This is indeed a Nash equilibrium with our tie-breaking rule above but can fail to be an equilibrium with other tie-breaking rules.
If, for example, c 1 < c 2 and a mass of consumers does not buy from firm 1 whenever
is not an equilibrium as firm 1 could increase its profits by decreasing its price by a sufficiently small amount. Assuming a tie-breaking rule such that a Nash equilibrium exists has two advantages: First, it gives us a benchmark to which we can compare correlated equilibria. Second, as every Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a correlated equilibrium, we know that a correlated equilibrium exists.
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Note also that the behavior of the consumers that corresponds to this assumption is optimal, and that the Nash equilibrium would therefore also be a Nash equilibrium of the wider game in which a group of consumers acts as players.
An alternative to our "buy from the low cost firm" assumption would be to assume that all k firms that charge the same lowest price p sell the same quantity D(p )/k ("equal splitting"). Blume (2003) shows that a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exists with equal splitting if D is continuously differentiable. Since we did not assume differentiability of D (and as it is unclear whether Blume's result holds without differentiability), we do not go this path. However, it should be noted that -with some minor modifications -all proofs would go through with the alternative assumptions of equal splitting and continuously differentiable demand.
Our setup gives therefore the following profits for firm i at a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ):
As before, a strategy for firm i is a measurable function p i : R + → R + and a distribution F on R n + is a correlated equilibrium if it satisfies (2) for all firms and all deviation strategies. We obtain our main theorem:
The proof, which is similar to the proof of theorem 1 though without using the shortcut of symmetry, is relegated to the appendix.
Conclusion
We have shown that marginal cost pricing is the unique correlated equilibrium in a symmetric Bertrand game with homogenous products and constant marginal costs. This establishes the well-known Bertrand paradox in its most general form. The idea of the Bertrand paradox is that the perfectly competitive outcome is unavoidable if two firms compete in prices (in a market for homogenous products). The set of correlated equilibria establishes -in an equilibrium sense -the set of payoffs that players can achieve noncooperatively. It might allow for forms of (self-enforcing) coordination and cooperation that are unattainable in other equilibrium concepts, e.g. Nash equilibrium. Therefore it is the natural solution concept to state an unavoidability-result like the Bertrand paradox.
We have also shown that the result generalizes to Bertrand settings with n firms and non-identical marginal costs. In this case, the market price paid by consumers is less or equal to the second lowest marginal costs with probability one in every correlated equilibrium, making correlated equilibrium equivalent to Bertrand Nash equilibrium also in this more general framework.
The key ingredients in our proof are (i) the discontinuities in the payoff functions that are typical for the Bertrand model and (ii) boundedness of possible equilibrium prices (induced by a bounded monopoly price). Loosely speaking, firm 1 sets prices above its costs only if firm 2 is sufficiently likely to set even higher prices. In a symmetric correlated equilibrium, ingredient (ii) gives us an essential supremum on the price distributionp. Whenever firm 2 receives a recommendation very close top, it must therefore be sure that -when following the recommendation -there is a sufficiently high chance of firm 1 getting a recommendation that is even closer top. Both firms, however, know that there is a significant chance that the other firm will just undercut them -otherwise the other firm would not follow such high recommendations! Since the marginal loss in lowering the price to somep − ε when getting a recommendation in (p − ε,p) is minimal while the upside of possibly undercutting the other firm is immense (the all-or-nothing nature of Bertrand competition, ingredient i), such deviations increase profits and contradict the existence of correlated equilibria with prices above costs.
The discontinuities of the profit functions explain also why our proof is unrelated to proofs of (essential) uniqueness of correlated equilibrium in other industrial organization models, e.g. Cournot competition (Liu, 1996) or price competition with differentiated goods (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) . Our proof does not work in these models because they have no payoff discontinuity. Vice versa, their proofs will not work for homogenous good Bertrand competition since it is not a supermodular game.
9 We conjecture that similar arguments as in our paper would also hold in other games that share the two ingredients mentioned above: (i) a threshold (depending on the other players' actions)
such that player i's payoff discontinuously decreases from a positive value to zero when passing the threshold and (ii) an upper bound on actions possible in equilibrium.
9 Liu (1996) considers an n-firm game that is not supermodular. However, the first step of his proof
shows that the non profitability of not deviating to the Nash equilibrium output already implies that the market quantity equals the Nash equilibrium quantity in any correlated equilibrium. No such result obtains in our model as deviating to marginal cost pricing is never strictly profitable and therefore cannot restrict potential correlated equilibria (in a symmetric Bertrand model).
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Given a correlated equilibrium F , we definep ∈ R + in the following way:p = inf{p :
(p ,∞) n dF (p) = 0} where p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ). Intuitively,p is the price such that (i) the probability that the market price is greater thanp is strictly positive for anyp <p and (ii) the probability that the market price is greater thanp is zero for anyp >p. That is, if we consider the distribution of prices that consumers pay in the correlated equilibrium F ,p is the essential supremum of this "market price distribution". Lemma 4. Let F be a correlated equilibrium and supposep = inf{p :
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists ap <p such that B(p) dF (p) > 0.
We will show that it is then profitable for firm 2 to use the following deviation strategy for ε > 0 sufficiently small
The profit difference of firm 2 between sticking to the recommendation and using ζ
Note that the first integral in the last line continuously converges to 0 as ε → 0. The second integral in the last line is, however, negative and bounded away from 0: First, we
show that the integrand is strictly negative and bounded away from zero.
is less
. Hence, the integrand is bounded from above
for all elements of B(p). By assumption, B(p) dF (p) > 0 which implies that the second integral is bounded from
). Consequently, ∆ ε 2 < 0 for ε > 0 small enough which contradicts that F is a correlated equilibrium.
We need one further auxiliary result. Roughly speaking, the result says that in a correlated equilibrium firm 1 will sell at a price in (p,p] with positive probability for anŷ p <p. Given the definition ofp, this should be hardly surprising.
Lemma 5. Let F be a correlated equilibrium such thatp = inf{p : (p ,∞) n dF (p) = 0} > c 2 . Then, A(p) dF (p) > 0 for anyp ∈ (c 2 ,p).
Proof. Take an arbitraryp ∈ (c 2 ,p). First, we show that p 1 ∈(p,p], p i >p ∀i =1 dF (p) = 0. The payoff difference between sticking to the recommendation and using ζ 1 is will sell D(p) units at pricep with positive probability: By the definition ofp, the event that all firms get a recommendation abovep has positive probability. Hence, firm i sells with positive probability at pricep when using the strategy ζ i .
Using lemma 4, we can now show the main result: In any correlated equilibrium, p ≤ c 2 . This means that the price that consumers pay will be weakly less than c 2 with probability 1. Consequently, the expected profits for firms 2, . . . , n are zero and the expected profits of firm 1 are bounded from above by D(c 2 )(c 2 − c 1 ) in any correlated equilibrium (assuming that c 2 is lower than the lowest monopoly price of firm 1; otherwise, firm 1's monopoly profits are, of course, the upper bound of firm 1's equilibrium profits).
Suppose to the contraryp > c 2 in a correlated equilibrium F . Letp = and distinguish the two cases
10 We use p −1 = p 2 , . . . , p n to denote the prices of all firms but firm 1.
